Rebecca Tushnet
Obligatory disclaimer: This is a statement of a problem. I’m not sure what I think
about it yet, and I’m still kicking the tires of most of the arguments. I reserve the
right to change my mind at any point.
I.

Central Hudson’s Other Problem

[The basic problem: For years, courts and commentators have assailed the
Supreme Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence as incoherent at best and anathema at
worst. The controversy, however, has focused on the test for regulating truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech. There has been much less attention to false and
misleading speech, and less still to the way that the two types of speech may
constitutionally be distinguished. Discussions have often been sidetracked into how to
formulate a disclaimer that would cure any misleading implications, as a less restrictive
alternative to banning the speech at issue entirely. As the arguments in Nike v. Kasky
show, the current version of false advertising law is incompatible with the current First
Amendment. And now that advertising law has been recognized by the Supreme Court
as problematic, the pressure to work the law pure through application of the First
Amendment may be irresistible. The question is, then, what a purified advertising law
would look like. The FDA, attempting to respond to recent court cases, has generated an
extensive body of commentary on acceptable ways to determine truth; its wellestablished regulatory apparatus, full of experts on the relevant, limited field, may
nonetheless have difficulty surviving the new First Amendment. While the FDA’s
mandate is limited, private lawsuits by competitors and consumers can cover any factual
claim at all, generating even more disputes than drugs and supplements do, making it
even more vulnerable to First Amendment challenges.]
False advertising law encompasses both private actions and direct government
regulation; here I will mainly consider private actions by competitors under the federal
Lanham Act, private actions by consumers under state law, and regulation by the Food
and Drug Administration, which dictates what some of the world’s biggest corporations
can say to the public about matters of life and death. The appropriate First Amendment
analysis of such laws would appear to come from the law of commercial speech, but,
even assuming that law were coherent, the Central Hudson test for evaluating restrictions
on commercial speech presupposes that the speech at issue is truthful. On the threshold
issue of how one determines truth for constitutional purposes, the Supreme Court has
been all but silent,1 and the academic literature generally little better.2
In recent years, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has joined the issue,
aggressively striking down FDA regulations on First Amendment grounds related to the
FDA’s high standards for acceptable truth, and in 2002 the Supreme Court, in Thompson
v. Western States Medical Center, invalidated a law prohibiting pharmacists from
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advertising that they could compound drugs, creating individually tailored formulations,
when compounding itself was legal. In response to the Supreme Court case, the FDA
propounded a stunningly far-ranging series of questions for comment on the proper scope
of its regulations. No longer is the FDA taking for granted that it can prohibit drug
companies from claiming that their drugs work unless the FDA agrees with their
interpretations of the evidence; in fact, the burden may be on the FDA to prove that
health and efficacy claims are wrong before it can act. The numerous responses to the
FDA's request for comments suggest that whatever consensus existed on regulation of
drug claims may be breaking down, possibly because of growing competition from
dietary supplements and so-called natural remedies.
Unfortunately for those hoping for some further guidance, the Supreme Court
recently dismissed as improvidently granted Nike v. Kasky, a case in which a concerned
citizen of California (or officious interloper, depending on how one sees Marc Kasky)
sued Nike for allegedly making false statements about its contractors' labor practices in a
variety of contexts, including letters to college presidents, press releases, and
advertorials. Nike claimed that the complaint should have been dismissed because it was
engaging in protected speech about matters of intense public interest. As with the fallout
from Thompson, the volume of submissions to the Court, as well as their content, is
evidence that false advertising law is extremely vulnerable to challenge under current
First Amendment jurisprudence. The Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted
because of concerns about the finality of the judgment, the standing of the parties, and the
lack of clarity of the facts at this stage of the litigation, which had not progressed past a
motion to dismiss. An examination of the many contested aspects of the case -- the facts
that needed finding – shows just how uncomfortably the law fits within traditional First
Amendment jurisprudence.
The danger in deciding Nike in Nike's favor, as it almost surely would have been,
was that there were no convincing rationales that let Nike freely claim that its labor
practices were sound without imperiling an enormous part of the modern regulatory state.
The Court could have simply drawn a line: California's law goes too far by allowing
Kasky to sue, but the traditional practices of the FDA, the SEC, and the FTC are fine.
That this line would be illogical and unjustified is no practical barrier to drawing it.3 One
problem with this response is that the First Amendment is quite charismatic; once First
Amendment analysis is applied instead of rejected, some regulations are going to fail a
court's scrutiny. In other words, law is full of contradictions that somehow remain stable,
but courts tend to want to work the law in any particular field pure, and Nike’s success in
defining the relevant field as First Amendment law risked destabilizing all regulation of
the truth of commercial claims.4
II.
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The FDA oversees about $1 trillion worth of products each year, nearly a quarter
of the American economy.6 It is the most popular regulatory agency, routinely achieving
seventy-five percent public approval since the 1970s, more popular than Presidents
Reagan and George H.W. Bush.7 Furthermore, the public expects and trusts that the FDA
is looking out for its health. Studies show that Americans generally believe that the pills
and medicines they can buy have been tested for safety and approved by the FDA, even
when that is not the case, as with vitamins and herbal supplements.8
[Western States; Washington Legal Fund v. Friedman]
In Pearson v. Shalala, the DC Circuit invalidated the FDA’s regulations for
dietary supplement claims, particularly the requirement of “significant scientific
agreement” before supplements were allowed to make health claims. The FDA was
required to allow claims in most circumstances as long as the claims included a
disclaimer. Then, after Western States, the FDA issued an expansive and perhaps
alarming request for comments on First Amendment issues, covering essentially the
FDA’s entire jurisdiction:
1. Are there arguments for regulating speech about drugs more comprehensively
than, for example, about dietary supplements? What must an administrative
record contain to sustain such a position? In particular, could FDA sustain a
position that certain promotional speech about drugs is inherently misleading,
unless it complies with FDA requirements? ….
2. Is FDA's current position regarding direct-to-consumer and other
advertisements consistent with empirical research on the effects of those
advertisements, as well as with relevant legal authority? ….
….
6. What arguments or social science evidence, if any, can be used to support
distinguishing between claims made in advertisements and those made on labels?
Does the First Amendment and the relevant social science evidence afford the
Government greater latitude over labels?
7. Would permitting speech by manufacturer, distributor, and marketer about offlabel uses undermine the act's requirement that new uses must be approved by the
FDA? If so, how? If not, why not? What is the extent of FDA's ability to regulate
speech concerning off-label uses?
8. Do FDA's speech-related regulations advance the public health concerns they
are designed to address? Are there other alternative approaches that FDA could
pursue to accomplish those objectives with fewer restrictions on speech?
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9. Are there any regulations, guidance, policies, and practices FDA should
change, in light of governing First Amendment authority?9
The scope of the request can be explained in part by the ideological commitments
of the FDA’s current general counsel, Daniel Troy, who in private practice represented
pharmaceutical and tobacco companies challenging, on First Amendment grounds, the
FDA’s right to regulate their offerings.10
This sequence of events is evidence of the corrosive power of the First
Amendment in action. Though the scope of the request for comments reflects the current
administration's attitude towards government regulation of business, it is also ruthlessly
logical. If the FDA can't prohibit dietary supplement claims or advertising of
compounded drugs, why can it prohibit drug companies from stating that a study showed
that a drug was effective against breast cancer, regardless of whether the drug was
approved for breast cancer? Conversely, if the FDA can’t prohibit drug companies from
advertising “off-label,” unapproved uses for approved drugs, why does it have the power
to regulate claims of safety and efficacy in the first place?11
The goal of the reformers is clear: to cut back FDA regulatory power so that it is
limited to addressing proven frauds12 – not, notably, to avoid falsity, which is a broader
category, or to keep claims off the market in the first place. The First Amendment
arguments correspond with a resurgence of substantive due process claims that also
attempt to limit the FDA’s ability to restrain the pharmaceutical trade.13 The assault on
the FDA’s authority is one of the starkest examples of the use of the First Amendment to
prevent economic regulations.
III.
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“[I]f we reach the merits, and if we have to address it, we’re going to have to
know what commercial speech is, I suppose.”14
[Facts/allegations: Beginning in 1996, Nike was targeted by protesters claiming
that it (actually, its subcontractors) underpaid and abused workers in developing
countries. Nike launched a public relations counteroffensive, including letters to the
editor, press releases, letters to college presidents who controlled lucrative athletic
contracts, and so on. Nike’s communications discussed general issues of globalization,
suggesting that what looked exploitative from outside was welcomed by workers in
developing areas, and also specifically defended the treatment of its subcontractors’
workers. Marc Kasky believed that Nike was not telling the truth in those claims, so he
sued, as California law allowed him to do.]
Nike and its amici made a number of powerful arguments that the application of
the California false advertising law to its conduct would violate the First Amendment.
Unfortunately, some of the most intuitively persuasive arguments provide no distinction
between Kasky's claims and those of any other false advertising plaintiff, or the
government regulating drug claims or securities filings.
The easiest defense to grasp is that the government lacks an interest in regulating
statements about the conditions under which a product is manufactured, as opposed to
product characteristics. Regardless of how ill-fed and ill-housed (or well-fed and wellhoused) Nike's subcontractors' workers were, the shoes are the same, so the government
interest in consumer protection should not extend to statements such as Nike's.
One could, of course, dispute the factual premise. Perhaps shoes made by
distressed workers are more likely to be defective than shoes made by content workers.
More significantly, this distinction is inconsistent with the basic premise of advertising
regulation, which is that consumers should be able to fulfill their preferences, or have
their preferences changed, and not be deceived. Giving the consumer a satisfactory
product doesn’t make up for deceiving her to close the sale, as the Supreme Court
explained with reference to the link between trademark and general false advertising law:
[T]he seller has used a misrepresentation to break down what he regards to be an
annoying or irrational habit of the buying public – the preference for particular
manufacturers or known brands regardless of a product’s actual qualities, the
prejudice against reprocessed goods, and the desire for verification of a product
claim. In each case the seller reasons that when the habit is broken the buyer will
be satisfied with the performance of the product he receives. Yet, a
misrepresentation has been used to break the habit and … a misrepresentation for
such an end is not permitted.15
Consumer protection is about more than consumer health, safety, or even
pocketbooks. It includes the consumer's interest in getting what she paid for, whether
that was cruelty-free beauty or low-calorie ice cream, whether or not her preferences are
rational. Or, if that is not a sufficient government interest to suppress speech, we will
have to get rid of rather a lot of regulation, including a healthy chunk of trademark law
14
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(for goods of equivalent quality). Conditions of product production that make a
difference to consumers include "Made in America,"16 “EPA approved,”17 "dolphin-safe
tuna," "Union Made," "shade-grown coffee," and many others. The FTC regulates
product endorsements by celebrities and other authorities, even though they often have no
connection with product characteristics, because consumers think that endorsement
matters. Courts will enjoin commercials that falsely claim that one soda beat another in a
taste test, again no matter how tasty the soda is.
Getting rid of those cases might be satisfactory to believers in a strong, libertarian
First Amendment. But for them, the product characteristics/conditions of production
division makes even less sense. What is a product characteristic? Consumers are
probably better suited to determining that than courts; if a consumer finds information
relevant to her purchase decision, then there is no non-paternalistic reason not to respect
her preferences. Ironically, the distinction proposed by Nike and some of its amici, while
superficially attractive, is far more regulatory at heart than a blanket prohibition on
misleading consumers, since it requires government to decide what consumers should
legitimately care about.
Relatedly, Nike suggested that product characteristics are more readily verifiable
by an advertiser than conditions of manufacture in our modern, subcontractor economy.
This, too, cannot be the law. Some product characteristics are almost impossible to
verify, such as the relative performance of one analgesic compared to another, a topic that
generated decades of litigation among the competitors and the FTC.18 Some conditions
of manufacture are simple to verify.
Justice Breyer noted that the materials at issue in Nike appeared outside of a
traditional advertising format, focusing on a letter sent to numerous college presidents.
The letter was, as he pointed out, different from a newspaper or television ad. But then, it
was directed to a much smaller audience than a newspaper or television show: people
who controlled college athletic budgets. False advertising law has had no difficulty
16
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finding similar letters to be commercial speech when they targeted small, specialized
markets, and this makes perfect sense. Justice Breyer offers no reason to have a smallmarket exception to the law. Nor is Justice Breyer’s general attention to format
appropriate, especially in a world in which advertising can take any form we can
conceive and probably some we can’t.19 The press releases that form part of the
challenged materials in Nike are increasingly standard means of communicating directly
with consumers, as companies know that material in their press releases will often be
passed on without alteration by reporters, or even read directly by consumers.
[Other aspects of California false advertising law combined to make Kasky's
claim especially weak. California law, like the federal Lanham Act and most state
consumer protection laws, lacks any scienter requirement. Perfectly good-faith errors, if
false, can lead to liability. In addition, California's standing requirement for consumer
suits is minimal at best. Kasky had never bought a pair of Nike shoes, which does make
his harm from Nike's alleged misstatements a bit hard to identify.]
The government's theory was an interesting one: It wasn't that there was anything
(much) wrong with the substantive cause of action; the problem was that, under
California law, any officious intermeddler could appoint herself a private attorney general
and bring a false advertising action against a company, regardless of whether she herself
had suffered any damage from the false advertising. The theory has some appeal, at least
as an enhancer of the free speech risks of the cause of action; as a practical matter, we
can expect more litigation, and thus more of a speech-deterrent effect, when anyone with
a grudge and a willingness to risk the expense can litigate rather than forcing the
government, with its always limited resources, to pick and choose what advertising to
assail. But, as the Court pointed out at oral argument, by First Amendment logic a cause
of action unsound in private hands is at least equally so in government hands. The
Solicitor General suggested that the government was more to be trusted -- "I'm from the
government and I'm here to help you" -- but, unsurprisingly, found little support in the
case law for this proposition.
[Scienter/strict liability as a serious problem, both for the Lanham Act and the
FDA. No matter how strong the First Amendment gets, we wouldn't expect fraud law to
disappear, but there is a big difference between good-faith mistake and deliberate
deception, one that has made a First Amendment difference in other contexts. Why
wouldn't it do so here? Even a negligence standard, urged by a number of the Nike briefs,
would have immense consequences in false advertising law generally. Not to mention
the potential consequences for the FDA, the SEC, et cetera, where the logic would apply
equally.]
[False advertising law may be particularly vulnerable because it, unlike copyright
and trademark, has no well-recognized property interest to which it can appeal as a
counterweight to a free speech claim. Eldred shows the potential of defining an
intangible interest as a property right – it magically moves from part of the marketplace
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of ideas to the actual marketplace, where it's all right to deny access to those who can't
pay. Trademark law has self-consciously moved in the direction of property right,
instead of consumer protection device, for decades. Notably, the EU defines a business's
property right in its reputation to include the right not to be spoken of at all, even
truthfully. We could define Kasky's interest in not being deceived as a property right,
though it's a little harder; we could with less strain define Converse's interest in
competing against Nike on the merits as a property interest, part of its goodwill being its
comparative position. But that has not been done, and false advertising law therefore
lacks one of the most powerful rhetorical countermoves to a free speech claim.]
Pearson and the FDA’s comprehensive rethinking of its role may herald the
future of much regulation of commercial speech.

